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MANDATE
Milton M. Harrison*
In two cases' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reiterated the well
established rule that an agent acting on behalf of a corporation will incur
personal liability for contractual obligations unless he bears the burden of
proving that he disclosed that he was acting for his corporate principal and
not for himself. 2 However, in Webster v. Rushing,' the supreme court held
that when the contract is signed only by an agent in his capacity as president
of a corporation, and the corporation is identified, the agent does not then
incur personal liability; the judgment of the trial court holding the agent
liable in solido with his principal was reversed.
The finding of implied authority, as well as apparent authority, in
Southwest Motor Leasing, Inc. v. Matthews Lumber Co.,' is subject to
some doubt on the interpretation of the facts. In that case, plaintiff delivered
to an agent' an automobile, a lease agreement signed by plaintiff, a delivery
receipt to be signed by the defendant-lessee, and an invoice for the rental
payment for the first month plus a deposit. Defendant insisted on paying the
.rental for one year in advance and the agent prepared a new invoice,
received the rental for one year, and marked the invoice paid. The agent
remitted only the deposit and two monthly payments to plaintiff. The court
held that by giving the agent authority to collect the deposit and one monthly
rental payment, plaintiff impliedly authorized the agent to collect full
payment in advance. The court went on to find that plaintiff was also
estopped to deny that the agent had such authority because plaintiff had, by
giving possession of the automobile and documents to the agent, led the
defendant to rely reasonably that the agent had such authority. These
conclusions may not be justified. A principal may entrust an agent with
authority to collect rental payments as they become due, knowing that it
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Lagniappe of New Orleans, Ltd. v. Denmark, 330 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1976); American Rent All, Inc. v. Culotta, 328 So. 2d 743 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975).
2. See Chartres Corp. v. Twilbeck, 305 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974);
Prevost v. Gomez, 251 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
3. 316 So. 2d 111 (La. 1975).
4. 325 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
5. The agent was characterized as a broker but the court found that he was not
in fact a broker.
376 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
risks the loss of no more than the rental for one month, if the agent proves to
be unreliable or dishonest. The same principal may be unwilling to trust the
agent to receive twelve times that amount in advance which increases the
risk of loss materially. It may be said that the authority to collect money as it
becomes due does not imply the authority to collect money in advance of its
due date; nor is a third person justified in believing that such is the case and
his reliance on such an interpretation does not give rise to an estoppel under
apparent authority.6
6. See Kansas Educ. Ass'n. v. McMahan, 76 F.2d 957 (10th Cir. 1935).
